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The core European economic policy debates of the last decade, and probably the next, 
surrounds the wisdom or otherwise fiscal consolidation and other austerity policies, pursued 
in response to higher public debt and credibility concerns sparked by the Global Financial 
and Eurozone crises. The IMF and the Politics of Austerity charts how the IMF fed into those 
debates, promoting one prominent set of diagnostic economic ideas about the crisis, and 
appropriate responses. In the process, the IMF re-evaluated its understanding of financial 
markets and their relationship to economic stability, and also re-assessed its understandings 
fiscal policy efficacy for advanced economies it deemed to have ‘fiscal space’. In this 
contribution I address a range of issue raised in this symposium about austerity, the IMF, and 
the politics of economic ideas. For European politics scholars, the IMF warrants closer 
inspection than it often receives. This, as Lagarde put it, is ‘not your grandmother’s IMF’.1  
Beyond Neoliberalism 




I am most grateful to the symposium participants for such searching, thought-provoking and 
positive critical engagements with my book. It always fascinates me how seeing the way 
other people see and read your own work makes one think about it afresh. This seems to be 
all the more true when one has been ploughing a particular furrow for many years. 
Although first and foremost a book about the IMF, The IMF and the Politics of Austerity is 
also a statement of intent about how to go about doing ideationally oriented political 
economy work. As Hodson notes, the book makes the case that, sometimes at least, it makes 
sense to go beyond (or at least avoid) the broad-brush terminology of neo-liberalism when 
talking about evolving economic ideas. This term, despite or perhaps because of its 
imprecision, exerts a tremendously powerful gravitational pull over political economy 
scholars. One illustration of this that Ban urges my return to it in his critique! 
Neo-liberalism as a terminology and as a means to better understand the IMF, has limitations 
and can be somewhat analytically debilitating. Describing economic ideas as ‘neo-liberal’ 
hinders more that it helps because it does not exclude very much, and does not tell us enough 
about the content of ideas and their policy corollaries. Drilling down into how the politics of 
economic ideas plays out in more granular detail, as in my book, demonstrates the value of 
disaggregating beyond the label ‘neo-liberal’. Only the can one reveal the more fine-grained 
contours of evolutions in economic theorising, as well  as in IMF policy thinking and 
practice. 
As one digs deeper, one finds a wide range of economic insights in play within this 
‘neoliberal’ institution - including and heterodox elements. There are also complex processes 
of translation from the underlying doctrinal positions and assumptive foundations, at a high 
level of abstraction and generality, to their operationalization through particular methods and 
economic models, and more concrete policy-oriented concepts. None of these important 
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processes are likely to be the focus of attention if one has already resorted to the shorthand of 
neoliberalism. Conversely, in terms of research practice, side-stepping ‘neo-liberalism’ can 
open the door to mapping the contours of economic thinking more accurately, using as source 
material schools of thought in economics. This yields more analytical traction and 
explanatory purchase over how IMF thinking evolves (see also Chwieroth 2007, 2010). As 
Hodson puts it in his contribution to this symposium, one payoff of these schools of 
economic thought is that ‘they map onto the work of specific economists and the views 
expressed by IMF staff in an altogether more straightforward way than neo-liberalism ever 
could’ (2018). 
Casual allusions to ‘dominant economic orthodoxy’, like those to ‘neoliberalism’, tend to 
assume doctrinal singularity and homogeneity. The breadth a variety of ideas in play can be 
overlooked. In fact, almost diametrically opposing views of fiscal policy can be found within 
the mainstream of ‘New Consensus’ macroeconomics. This breadth, along a wide continuum, 
of fiscal policy approaches reconcilable to ‘mainstream economic thinking’ means there is no 
one single ‘lesson from economics’ for policy that policy elites can imbibe. Rather, there is a 
range of respectable academic economic opinion – a fact that can get overlooked when 
talking in broad-brush terms about neoliberalism. 
The IMF and the Politics of Austerity charts how this breadth and scope within New 
Consensus Macro was used by IMF ‘bricoleurs’ in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) to rehabilitate a positive view towards counter-cyclical fiscal policy as both a crisis-
management and a stabilisation tool. For those advanced economies who enjoy fiscal space, 
the Fund’s repeatedly underscored central insight is how much more effective fiscal policy 
can be under recessionary conditions, where monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower 
bound. This is particularly so in recessions that follow financial crisis. 
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But as Ban’s contribution to this symposium points out, only a minority of mainstream NCM 
economists saw the need for or merits of a rethink of models and assumptions on the scale the 
Fund piloted. The leading macroeconomics journals continue to reproduce what Ban calls 
‘work with orthodox rational expectations-based models designed as if there had been no 
crisis’. Many remain in thrall to the same esoteric and somewhat unrealistic ‘representative 
agent with rational expectations’ (RARE) underpinnings, derived from New Classical 
economics, which had formed the assumptive foundations of mainstream econometric 
modelling in the decade before the crash. Ban puts his finger on the relative autonomy, 
perhaps even marginality, of the Fund from the centre of gravity of conventional New 
Consensus economics thinking. This throws into sharper relief both the intellectual work 
done by Fund economists to bolster their new thinking, and the fact that the Fund has not 
brought the majority of economists along with them to its more heterodox views.  
Indeed, within that continuum of ‘mainstream’ economic thought, the Fund occupies a 
somewhat liminal space on issues of macroeconomic stabilisation which tests its credentials 
as a font of scientific economic policy wisdom. That the Fund’s position in the vanguard of a 
rethink has not been widely taken up within the economics profession perhaps pushes the 
limits of its intellectual authority which is so crucial for the institution to gain ‘traction’ in 
international economic policy debates. If the Fund does have fellow travellers on the road to 
revising the premises of its models to make them more relevant for post-GFC policy analysis, 
they are more likely found in central banks than academic economics. Central banks, given 
their operational remit, constitute a more fruitful hunting ground than some parts of academic 
economics for the corroboration and authoritative recognition which are so important to new 
Fund economic ideas gaining ground. Blanchard himself has recognised this difference and 
distance in modelling ambitions between academic and policy oriented research (2018: 48). 
Yet how far the Fund is prepared to follow the Bank of England down a path towards 
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accepting the limits of scientifically managing the economy? Could the IMF also embrace 
different ‘rationalities of governance’ (Thompson 2017), auguring reduced reliance on and 
proximity to academic macroeconomics? This seems unlikely, but this is a research proposal 
waiting to be written.  
Policy Paradigms – and Bricolage 
In the background of most political economy studies dealing with economic ideas is a notion 
of ideational change understood in paradigmatic terms (Hall 1993). The book was not written 
as a critique of the policy paradigm approach, but the more I learned about the Fund, the less 
helpful a standard paradigm framework proved for understanding its evolutions. The research 
findings do not indicate ideational change to be anything like so cut and dried as a paradigm 
shift, nor did paradigm maintenance adequately capture what was going on. Symposium 
contributors have found the mechanisms of ideational change I delineated useful. 
Approaching the politics of economic ideas through this lens offers a route out of a paradigm 
change world-view. They point to the fact that there are kinds of ideational change in 
economic thinking other than paradigm shift that are important and interesting. For example, 
it is not the case that the post-GFC IMF advocates a different approach to fiscal policy for all 
countries at all times under all conditions. The Fund is not looking for a new fiscal policy 
template. What we are faced with instead is a granular but significant transformation of the 
centre of gravity of fiscal policy thinking, whose pace and degree can vary – notably 
according to nationally differentiated assessments of fiscal space. 
Ban invites us to see the IMF’s evolution as ‘translation of the old neoliberal paradigm into a 
new, revisionist, neoliberal fiscal paradigm’. Leaving to one side the need to know much 
more about this ‘translation’ process, such a characterisation – where the pre-crash and post-
crash Fund reside comfortably within the same paradigm – pushes beyond the limits of where 
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saying the two positions fall within the same paradigm tells us very much. At the fulcrum of 
the paradigm framework is a worldview. The IMF shifted from a pre-crash view which 
accepted, broadly speaking, Ricardian equivalence to a post-crash position where it rejects it. 
Those are two incommensurable worldviews and fundamentally different understandings of 
the economy and policy. If this shift remains within a paradigm with the same label, then the 
concept risks being stretched in ways which limit its analytical purchase. 
Contra a paradigm approach, a multiplicity of views are built into the Fund’s knowledge 
bank, standard operating procedures, and policy frameworks, drawn from different 
paradigmatic homes. A repertoire of acceptable, respectable economic  ideas are ‘in play’ 
within the Fund, and which come to the fore depends in part on economic conjuncture, and 
upon who is the recipient of the policy advice, amongst other factors. This tells against the 
standard paradigm change story fitting the facts in this instance. This broad church of 
economic thinking – its contours, its policy corollaries – is revealed by the above research 
practice identifying a range of schools of economic thought and their subcultures of adherents 
within the Fund. 
These characteristics if IMF economic ideas are why bricolage proves so persuasive a concept 
in this case. Yet it does not commit us, as Hodson fears, to ad hocery where anything goes. Far 
from it. The need to secure the Fund’s reputation, sustain intellectual credibility with its 
audience, and the importance attached to the coherence of its economic policy message place 
limits on which ideas the Fund will incorporate, and how. Constructivist Institutionalist 
analysis of the kind developed in my book is alive to ideational path dependency dynamics. 
Pre-existing Fund thinking, broadly rooted in the Keynesian/Neo-classical synthesis which 
underpinned the Fund’s financial programming techniques of the 1950s and 1960s, continues 
to be an important foundation of Fund work today. The Fund’s economic policy thinking and 
recommendation largely remained consistent a short-term Keynesian, long-term neo-classical 
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dichotomy (see e.g. Stockhammer 2011; Romer 1993). This somewhat anachronistic amalgam 
still forms the bedrock of Fund economic thinking – providing an intellectual anchor to which 
new ideas must be reconciled. 
Nevertheless, as noted by Hodson, the theoretical eclecticism in evidence can require Fund 
economists to reckon with some contradictions in their thinking. This is one of the most 
fascinating questions, and spurs to further research, provoked by my findings. Reading 
inordinate numbers of Fund working papers and flagship publications, and conducting 
lengthy searching interviews with many Fund economists, all of which were integral to the 
research process underpinning my book, one is struck that there does seem to be a degree of 
cognitive dissonance with which IMF economists can work. The Fund incorporates multiple 
modes of thinking about economic policy, different and even incommensurable 
understandings of the economy, not only in organisation as a whole but also in one staff 
economists’ head. IMF economists appear comfortable operating with different and even 
incompatible economic world-views depending on the policy issue and economic 
conjuncture. 
Different Staff economists, depending on training, pre-disposition and experience, will have 
allegiances to or sympathy with different positions on the above spectrum of respectable 
economic thinking. Acknowledging the repertoire of IMF ideas, from a range of schools of 
thought, brings to the fore the political role played by the Fund and other actors seeking to 
shape understandings of sound economic policy conduct. Whilst presenting their line in 
technocratic terms, the positioning on fiscal policy amounts to a normatively-informed 
judgement call and a political decision.  
In part, the contradictions derived from theoretical eclecticism are dealt with through the 
mantra of ‘when the facts change…’, which IMF staff see themselves as guided by. The 
8 
 
institution puts very significant resources behind learning the lessons of perceived past 
mistakes. There is a self-reflexive dimension to Fund thinking and speaking – a self-
conscious desire to demonstrate learning. The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office reports 
have offered some trenchant auto-critique of Fund conduct, both during the East Asian crisis 
and during the Global Financial crisis. This feeds into internal organisational procedures. For 
example, Strategy Policy and Review department, what Momani’s interviewee memorably 
terms the Fund ‘thought police’ (2005:182), in exercising its oversight over and sign-off on 
all Fund intellectual production, looks for this evidence of learning from past practice. This 
has been one sources of a slightly more diverse set of economic ideas and pre-dispositions 
that have been incorporated into the 21st Century Fund.  
The contradictions presented by amalgamating divergent economic views become more acute 
when we consider the ideological underpinnings of all economic analysis. Yet economics as a 
profession and discipline tends to gloss over its ideological underpinnings beneath a scientific 
veneer. In a way that reveals what Chwieroth has called the ‘productive power of economics’ 
(2010: 33), it is part of the Fund’s scientific culture to do likewise. This shaping role of 
economics informs, as Barnett and Duvall put it, why ‘certain “problems” come to be 
constructed’ in the way they are, and why particular bodies of knowledge are ‘authorized or 
legitimated in the construction of those problems’ (Barnett & Duvall 2005: 21-22). The IMF 
narrates its own ideational evolution in terms of practical, pragmatic, policy-oriented 
‘clinical’ economists operating in a Bayesian world of rational updating of their economic 
ideas in the light of new evidence. Yet this overlooks the fact that economic ideas are always 
rooted in ideological assumptions about how the economy and policy work. 
New information and evidence, presented by the Lehman crash and the Great Recession, has 
been one source of the fiscal policy shift. Yet what separates the ‘expansionary fiscal 
contraction’ position decisively rejected by the Fund from its post-crash view positing high 
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fiscal multipliers is, at root, a priori normative pre-suppositions rooted in the principles of 
political economy. These have divided political economists down the centuries: pre-
dispositions regarding fiscal policy efficacy and whether the state can and should intervene in 
the economy to improve the growth. This is uncomfortable territory for a Fund keen to assert 
its intellectual authority as a source of scientific, technocratic wisdom on economic policy, 
and to retain a non-political character removed from such ideological considerations. 
Technocracy and Politics 
Moschella, in her contribution, puts her finger on the ‘complicated dilemmas that the Fund is 
required to navigate by virtue of its institutional design at the intersection of technocracy and 
politics’. This should become a wider research programme for European and international 
politics, extending beyond the IMF to explore similar dynamics amongst financial regulators, 
central bankers and others. Whilst Fund commentary is cloaked in scientific and technocratic 
parlance, how economic theory is invoked in economic policy recommendation, by the IMF 
as by anyone else, is inherently political. The politics of economic ideas pervades what is a 
selection and framing exercise, choosing which ideas and insights to draw on, which methods 
to use, and what balance of prioritisation to strike. As one recent study of IMF surveillance 
put it, ‘methodological practices should be examined as a process wherein the illusion of 
distance between the technical and political is constructed and maintained’. For all the Fund’s 
‘heavy reliance on claims of technical and apolitical authority and expertise’ in its 
surveillance practices and positions have an inevitably political character (Robles 2018: 227). 
As Johnston notes, apparently small policy details within economic evaluation – such as size 
of fiscal multipliers, or the use structural as opposed to nominal measures, can be of cardinal 
importance in terms of their policy implications and ramifications. These seemingly technical 
issues can be of huge political economic significance. In order to explore the dilemmas of this 
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fascinating intersection between technocracy and politics, the next wave of political economy 
work on the Fund and other international economic institutions needs to learn more about the 
politics of economic methodology (See e.g. Robles 2018; Yarrow 2018).  
The Fund’s influence rests on its mandate, reputation and track record as a technocratic, 
scientific source of reputable economic policy wisdom. These scientific and technocratic 
credentials are crucial for the Fund to retain its political power as it plays the role trying to 
prick the conscience of what it sees as misguided economic policy-makers. Yet the Fund, 
including in its methodological choices, and especially in the selection of which economic 
ideas and insights are afforded primacy, makes normatively driven interventions in economic 
policy debates. Sailing close to wind, and risking letting its technocratic apolitical façade slip, 
the IMF may occasionally enjoy scope to shape and shift the boundaries of what constitutes 
‘legitimate’ policy. This was what the Fund sought to do in the European politics of austerity 
debate, where the Fund took on the how far? How fast? to pursue fiscal consolidation issue. It 
is also true of the Fund agenda on tackling inequality. 
The horns of another dilemma around technocracy and politics faced by the Fund were 
revealed in the maelstrom of the GFC. The Fund arguably achieved most ‘traction’ when it 
did not observe its normal bureaucratic standard operating procedures and scientific norms of 
internal approval. Strauss-Kahn and Blanchard, at the G20 in November 2008, undertook a 
back of the envelope assessment of the size of fiscal stimulus that would be politically 
acceptable to fiscal conservatives, whilst being on a scale sufficient to meet the economic 
need. The timeliness of the intervention, and the clarity of the message would not have been 
possible through regular Fund peer review and sign off processes, wherein caveats and 
rejoinders are attached which can dilute the policy line. 
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This moment – the Fund’s high profile call for a 2% global fiscal stimulus – was key in 
demonstrating the institution’s relevance and helped save its skin. The substantial increase of 
Fund financial resources from member states, which meant that internal staff cutbacks could 
be ceased and reversed, followed soon after. Yet this was a judgement call that went through 
none of the normal internal peer review and sign-off processes which reinforce the 
institution’s scientific norms. It was experienced as a surprise, perhaps even an unwelcome 
one, by many Fund insiders. In hindsight, most recognised Strauss-Kahn as playing a pivotal 
role in reviving the Fund’s fortunes, as well as in the management of the crisis. Yet this was 
achieved by departure from how the Fund normally gets done. When the next big crisis hits, 
will the IMF leadership be able to think outside the box and act swiftly as Strauss-Kahn 
effectively did?  
Fund/Member State Interactions: Traction and Inter-Elite Persuasion 
There are, of course, different ways to understand the Fund as a ‘political’ organisation. One 
much travelled road is the Fund’s relations with its powerful members. Did member states 
lead and did the Fund follow? The intellectual leadership, and outlier status within 
mainstream economics, of the IMF’s post-crash thinking discussed above tells against the 
Fund as follower narrative. The Fund’s Research Department in particular was in the 
vanguard of new research on post-crash fiscal policy. More fundamentally, though, it is not 
clear that the IMF and its member states are as ontologically separable as posing the question 
in that way implies. The protagonists are all engaged the same economic policy debate. They 
are part of the same economic policy elite, with revolving recruitment doors and innumerable 
secondments between national economic policy authorities and the Fund. 
Fund relations with its powerful members are, to my mind, best understood as process of 
attempted ‘inter-elite persuasion’ (Blyth RIPE 2007). The IMF seeks, as Johnston notes in 
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her contribution to this symposium, to ‘change minds behind the scenes’ partly by ‘finding 
allies in (national) elite circles that shared similar views on the crisis and how it should be 
managed.’ The Fund can open up policy space for advanced economy policy-elites seeking to 
bolster growth using macroeconomic policy in ways which retain the Fund’s seal of approval 
as ‘sound policy’.  Senior Fund members were able, in the wake of the Lehman crash, to 
‘play onside’ Keynesian thinking about fiscal policy. This was partly because it could count 
on like-minded elites in key capitals to help facilitate the international economic coordination 
of fiscal stimulus.  
The success of the Fund persuasive efforts is intermittent, and often partial – one contribution 
of The IMF and the Politics of Austerity, as contributors here have recognised, it to establish 
the limits of Fund success, and the conditions of possibility for it. There have been ‘victories’ 
including persuading the Commission to accept a slower path towards fiscal adjustment in the 
context of softening the application of stability and growth pact fiscal targets from 2012 
onwards. Not all the avenues the Fund sought to open up were taken up – a notable example 
being its expansive conception of Banking Union, and the large and more powerful public 
fiscal backstops the Fund urged upon the EU in the context of the Eurozone crisis. Unstinting 
hostility to these ideas from Germany in particular put paid to these aspirations. The ways in 
which the IMF was unsuccessful is a research finding in itself – generative of fresh insights 
into European, comparative and international political economy. 
The IMF and EU Institutions 
Hodson’s critique that the book does not apply the framework equally to all international 
organisations within the ambit of the books’ focus is well taken. Key institutional factors 
affecting EU and Eurozone crisis responses are indeed not the main focus of the analysis. 
Whilst I do note some differentiation and evolution amongst thinking in EU institutions, and 
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delineate differing views of EU governments (differentiating between French and German 
positions in particular). It would indeed be fruitful to explore EU institutions and actors more 
systematically through the lens of the book’s framework.  
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), as Ban highlights, is a key player in Eurozone 
crisis resolution, and it perhaps deserved more attention. The ESM developed as the crisis 
unfolded, often behind the scenes. As Erce has noted (2015), the ESM is the means by which 
European authorities have been able to take a softer stance towards fiscal and macroeconomic 
adjustment (through e.g. legthening debt maturities) than comes across in the headline 
grabbing hawkish discourses of the likes of Trichet, Merkel and Schauble over the last 
decade. As the ESM took shape the Fund, perhaps underestimating the ‘local competition’ 
threat it posed, envisaged a role for it countering the growth sapping and austerity-oriented 
proclivities of other parts of the EU economic governance landscape. The dynamics of this 
kind of inter-institutional completion in European crisis management is another research 
proposal waiting to be written. 
The prospects of the Fund exiting the European crisis programmes landscape, envisaged as a 
feature of Lagarde’s second term as Managing director of the IMF, result primarily from the 
frictions within the Troika over debt restructuring as the Fund defines it. The IMF remains 
convinced that up front debt restructuring, rather than on the quiet and through the back door, 
remains a necessary component of European recovery. The Fund’s potential withdrawal from 
European programmes is also, however, a ceding of ground to the ‘local competition’ from 
the ESM highlighted by Ban. The same recognition of the IMF’s limits may be part of the 
explanation behind the IMF’s positive view of prospective initiatives like the European 
Monetary Fund championed by Macron and Juncker. Perhaps, as a result of the painful 
compromises and the discomfiture of the IMF’s Troika experience, and frustrations at the 
limits of the traction it has been able to gain over European policy thinking and policy 
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developments more widely, we may be at the end of an era of the IMF’s mission creep into 
attempting hands-on management of the European political economy.  
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